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Abstract—In the fifth-generation (5G) networks and the be-
yond, communication latency and network bandwidth will be
no more bottleneck to mobile users. Thus, almost every mobile
device can participate in the distributed learning. That is, the
availability issue of distributed learning can be eliminated. How-
ever, the model safety will become a challenge. This is because the
distributed learning system is prone to suffering from byzantine
attacks during the stages of updating model parameters and
aggregating gradients amongst multiple learning participants.
Therefore, to provide the byzantine-resilience for distributed
learning in 5G era, this article proposes a secure computing
framework based on the sharding-technique of blockchain,
namely PIRATE. A case-study shows how the proposed PIRATE
contributes to the distributed learning. Finally, we also envision
some open issues and challenges based on the proposed byzantine-
resilient learning framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has spawned a lot of useful applications,
such as computer vision, and natural language processing, etc.
However, the parties who benefit from the technology are
mostly large organizations, e.g., commercial companies and
research institutes. Individuals who only hold devices with
limited computing-ability cannot take part in machine learning
tasks.
In fact, the combined power of individuals by their holding
devices has been much underestimated. For instance, the
mobility and the large population of the mobile users can
bring flexible computing possibilities. Taking these advantages
into account, the distributed learning [1] enables individual
devices to learn collaboratively. However, device heterogeneity
and network conditions have been viewed as the challenges of
distributed learning.
On one hand, a recent literature [2] shows that asynchronous
distributed learning starts to have a sound theoretical basis. In
the synchronous manner of distributed-learning, the unequal
training times in each iteration induce the inevitable waiting
dissipation on the fast training nodes. This problem brought
by device heterogeneity will be eliminated with the growing
maturity of the asynchronous learning.
On the other hand, communication latency and bandwidth
are still viewed as the bottleneck resources of distributed
machine learning [3]. Nowadays, the network bandwidth of
most users is still insufficient to support the distributed-
learning tasks. This situation makes distributed learning highly
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unavailable for the majority. Fortunately, latency and band-
width will be no more obstacles to distributed learning in the
era of the fifth-generation (5G) networks, because the network
conditions of individuals will be substantially improved.
Generally, the ideal factors that affect the distributed learn-
ing include the following aspects:
• High availability: any device can perform learning any-
time.
• High scalability: the learning framework should support
high concurrency, high communication efficiency and low
storage complexity.
• Decentralization: the intervention of a centralized third-
party is minimum.
• Byzantine-resilient model safety: the future distributed
learning should ensure byzantine-resiliency [4], which
indicates that the distributed learning can endure arbitrary
attacks.
Since the availability of distributed-learning systems can
be significantly improved in the 5G networks, we can rea-
sonably envision a distributed learning system in which the
heterogeneous devices are available anytime. This is because
the 5G technologies enable various devices to participate in
distributed-learning tasks with the sufficient network band-
width. In such a sound distributed learning system, another
challenge is that the learning system is prone to suffering
from byzantine attacks [4]. Therefore, more sophisticated ap-
proaches that can ensure the byzantine-resilience are required.
Recently, byzantine-resilient machine learning under mas-
ter/slave settings has gained much attention [5]–[7]. In a
byzantine-resilient distributed-learning task, two things are
risk-prone: 1) gradient aggregation, and 2) model parameters.
Conventionally, the byzantine-resilient distributed-learning
tasks are conducted under centralized settings, in which the
byzantine-tolerant components rely on a globally trusted third-
party as the parameter server. The problem is that the
workload-handling capacity of such the centralized parameter
server is usually a bottleneck while performing the distributed
learning. Moreover, to provide reliable services against the
vulnerability of single-point-of-failure (SPOF), the redundant
deployment of resources is entailed at the centralized third-
party. Therefore, the centralized byzantine-resilient learning
induces a high operational-expenditure (OPEX).
To achieve high availability while fulfilling the requirement
of OPEX-efficiency and byzantine-resiliency, the decentralized
learning system would ideally be decentralized. For example,
a recent study [3] claims that the decentralized learning system
is more efficient in terms of communication and storage than
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2the centralized learning systems. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the byzantine-resilient learning in a decentralized
manner has not been well studied.
Although the decentralized scheme shows the promising
efficiency, a great challenge in terms of model-safety comes
along with it. That is, the aggregation stage of distributed
learning can be easily falsified, since the distributed-learning
task becomes a collaboration among multiple peers. Once
the model parameters are contaminated at one of the peers,
this local-model contributor would bring limited or even
negative contribution to the holistic learning task. Thus, to
achieve the decentralized byzantine-resilience for distributed
learning, a state machine replication (SMR) protocol [4] is
require. As a representative paradigm of SMR protocols, the
blockchain technology can provide such the critical byzantine-
resilience to distributed learning. In detail, blockchains can
provide protection to the model parameters, particularly at the
stage of gradient aggregation, while ensuring a high level of
availability, cost-efficiency and decentralization.
To this end, this article proposes a sharding-based
blockchain framework, which is named PIRATE, for
byzantine-resilient distributed-learning under the decentralized
5G computing environment.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF DISTRIBUTED MACHINE
LEARNING IN 5G NETWORKS
A. Consensus Protocols for Decentralized Learning in 5G
To achieve the global agreement within a decentralized
setting, a byzantine-tolerant consensus protocol for SMR is
needed. Such the consensus protocol should ensure that the
honest nodes can reach an agreement on the order of correct
execution, i.e., model updates, even when a certain amount of
byzantine effort plays a role [4]. In this section, we first briefly
review the existing byzantine tolerant consensus protocols
towards SMR, and then analyze what protocol is applicable for
decentralized learning in the 5G era. For brevity, we call the
byzantine-tolerant consensus protocol the consensus protocol
in the remainder of this paper.
Consensus protocols can be categorized into 2 types: the
competition-based and the communication-based. The leader
of competition-based consensus, e.g., the Proof of Work (PoW)
adopted by bitcoin (https://bitcoin.org), needs to earn his lead-
ership through a “fair” competition. The communication-based
consensus protocols (e.g., Hotstuff [8]) select leaders through
a deterministic way, or based on an unbiased randomness
generated collaboratively.
In the context of blockchains, for the competition-based
consensus protocols, blocks are appended on the chain before
consensus while the communication-based protocols append
blocks thereafter. For the competition-based methods, higher
scalability inevitably incurs higher chance of forking. Plagued
by the byproduct, competition-based methods struggle to
achieve a high scalability.
While communication-based consensus protocols have no
concern of forks (instant finality), they require multiple rounds
of communication to reach an agreement. The high communi-
cation overhead also hurts the scalability of communication-
based protocols. Therefore, the communication-based proto-
cols are commonly used at a smaller scale.
Sharding-based consensus protocols [9], as a hybrid ap-
proach, can achieve scalable consensus in the permissionless
blockchain. Such hybridization benefits from the instant final-
ity of the communication-based methods, and permissionless
resiliency of the competition-based methods. One representa-
tive work of the sharding-based approaches is RapidChain [9],
which achieves a throughput of 7,300 tx/sec while maintaining
a total resiliency of 1/3, i.e., the RapidChain system functions
properly in face of 1/3 byzantine-malicious participants.
In 5G networks, we need a consensus protocol that is
available for a large scale of participants when they are training
large models. An ideal consensus protocol should be scalable
and permissionless. Sharding-based protocols make full use
of integrated resources by splitting a workload and amortizing
all tasks among multiple committees. Such scalable strategy
can fit perfectly in the environment of distributed machine
learning. However, permissionless distributed-learning in a
sharding-based community is challenging. Unlike a financial
system where good behaviors can be stimulated by a certain in-
centive mechanism, when performing the distributed-learning
tasks, only the honest behavior is not enough. Because partic-
ipants cannot adjust the network conditions and computation
abilities of their devices according to their behaviors. Thus,
a consistent assessment of training-reliability throughout the
training process is required for the distributed-learning task to
function efficiently at each participant. Accordingly, we adopt
a permissioned version of sharding-based consensus protocol
in our proposed framework.
B. Configurations of Distributed Machine Learning
Machine Learning problems mostly rely on certain specific
optimization problems. In the distributed machine learning,
each participant can only yield a partial solution. In order
to orchestrate a global optimization, as shown in Fig. 1,
computing nodes need to carry out the following steps. First,
each node computes local gradients based on their local data.
Then, nodes communicate with each other to get a globally
aggregated gradient for model update. Based on the style
how they get a global aggregation, two typical styles of
configuration have been proposed:
Master/slave style: A centralized parameter server aggre-
gates gradients and synchronizes the aggregated result at each
computing node.
Decentralized style: No centralized server is entailed. Each
node can only communicate with its neighbors to exchange
model parameters.
We then discuss the superiority of decentralization on dis-
tributed machine learning:
• Communication efficiency. A recent work [3] demon-
strated that the decentralized settings can better exploit
the bandwidth resource, avoid traffic jams and share
workloads among peers than the centralized master/slave
settings.
• Cost efficiency. When the scale of participation grows
substantially, no single party should be responsible for
3Fig. 1. The proposed PIRATE framework has two critical components: 1) reliability assessment, and 2) blockchain (BC) systems for distributed SGD (D-SGD).
Gradient aggregations and model parameters are protected by blockchains. Meanwhile, reliability assessment determines the participants of distributed learning
tasks.
maintaining the system. Analogous to the situation of
cloud netdisk services nowadays, if a service provider
plays such a dominant role, the OPEX cost of maintaining
the centralized system eventually transfer to clients. As
a feasible solution, service providers enforce clients to
choose between low quality of service (e.g., very limited
download speed) and expensive membership fee. This is
an opposite of win-win for both providers and clients,
provided that there are better solutions.
• Reliability. The centralized design of master/lave settings
suffer from SPOF problem. Once the centralized server
is overloaded or under attack, the whole system ceases
to function. Thus, the communication burdens and the
attack risks on one single server impair the reliability of
the system.
III. STATE-OF-THE-ART STUDIES OF
BYZANTINE-RESILIENT MACHINE LEARNING
A. Byzantine-Resilient Machine Learning
To train models in a large-scale multi-party network, serious
security problems are needed to address if adopt the Sharing
technique. As the scale of participants grows, the behaviors of
computing nodes become more unpredictable. The distributed
stochastic gradient descent (D-SGD) [10] framework should
tolerate byzantine attacks, i.e., arbitrary malicious actions,
such as sending harmful gradients and corrupting training
models as shown in Fig. 2. Current studies on Byzantine-
resilient machine learning mostly focus on protecting gradi-
ent aggregation. However, the parameters of training models
owned by each data trainer are also vulnerable to be falsified.
We elaborate the protection of gradient aggregation in the next
section, and analyze existing frameworks that can protect both
aspects of model training.
A blockchain-based learning method was proposed by Chen
et al. [11], in which the proposed architecture LearningChain
is able to simultaneously protect gradient aggregation and
model parameters, by storing them together on-chain. By
exploiting the traceability of blockchain, erroneous global
parameters produced by malicious nodes can be rolled back to
its former unfalsified state. Historical parameter records cannot
be falsified due to the tamper-proof character of blockchain.
The proposed byzantine-tolerant gradient aggregation with
a low computation-complexity is called “l-nearest gradients
aggregation”. This method ensures that if byzantine computing
nodes yield local malicious gradients to prevent the conver-
gence of learning algorithms, their effort would be mitigated.
However, LearningChain still utilizes a master/slave setting
for distributed gradient descend where the parameter server is
randomly selected by PoW competition. In addition, the on-
chain data could be potentially oversized, because any node
in the system would have to store all the historical model
parameters and gradients. Such architecture is prone to lead
to a significant traffic congestion and a substantial storage
overhead. When the scale of learning grows substantially,
the storage and communication overheads could potentially
weaken the advantage of distributed learning.
In terms of reliability, rollback can possibly fail if two
consecutive byzantine leaders collude. That is the case when
the previous byzantine leader contaminates the model updates
and the subsequent leader properly updates but based on the
contaminated model parameters. The honest leader following
the two previous byzantine leaders is unable to detect the
model contamination, since the model-examination process
terminates when the honest leader approves the immediate
update proposal, even though the update is based on contam-
inated model parameters. The essential problem is that, the
model update is examined by only one leader when a proposal
is submitted. In contrast, our proposed framework adopts a
more decentralized setting, in which all nodes can naturally
participate in validating the model updates, and every node
maintains its own training model rather than accepting updates
4from a third party.
B. Byzantine Protection on Gradients
Before the stage of updating training models, computing
nodes need to aggregate their local gradients. The conven-
tional aggregation solution of simple linear combinations (e.g.,
averaging [12]) cannot tolerate one byzantine worker [5].
Thus, byzantine protection on gradients aggregation has gained
much growing attention. Basically, the existing byzantine-
based approaches can be classified into 2 categories: the
tolerance-based methods and the detection-based methods.
Blanchard et al. [5] proposed a byzantine tolerant method
called Krum , and a variation called Multi-Krum which is an
interpolation between Krum and averaging [12]. Instead of
using a straight-forward linear combination of multiple local
gradients, Krum precludes gradients too far away from the
majority and chooses one local gradient based on a spatial
score. To improve convergence speed, Multi-Krum chooses
a number of local gradients based on the same score as
Krum, and outputs their average. Experiments show that even
with 33% of omniscient byzantine workers, the error rate is
almost the same as that of 0%. However, Krums computation
complexity is O(n2). Compare with the averaging approach
whose computation complexity is O(n), Krum may impede
the scalability of distributed learning.
The heuristic byzantine tolerant aggregation solution l-
nearest gradients proposed by Chen et al. [11] cannot guar-
antee safety against omniscient attacks by byzantine workers.
The aggregation solution is to aggregate l gradients closest,
based on their cosine distances, to the sum of the received
gradients. If an omniscient byzantine worker manages to
acquire all local gradients for other workers in time, the
byzantine worker can yield a local gradient that changes the
global sum arbitrarily [5]. Sacrificing security, the algorithm
gains a good time complexity O(n).
One byzantine-detection method proposed by Li et al. [7]
is designed for federated learning (FL). Existing byzantine-
tolerant aggregation methods are mostly inefficient due to the
non-identically and independently distributed training data.
Experiments show that their detection-based method has a
better performance than tolerance-based methods in federated
learning. In their setting, a credit score was assigned by the
pre-trained anomaly-detection model to each computing node.
Since the weight of the local gradient was determined by the
credit score, the weighted sum aggregation can filter out the
byzantine local gradients.
Besides the tolerance and detection methods, another ma-
chine learning method was proposed by Ji et al. [13] to
learn the gradient aggregation. Different from the deterministic
aggregation solution, they model the aggregation as a learning
problem. They utilize an Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
aggregator with all local gradients as input, and additional loss
information, i.e., the loss based on a small sample of dataset,
for each worker. The RNN aggregator optimizes an objective
that depends on the trajectory of the original optimization
problem.
The tolerance-based gradient aggregation methods are
mostly designed under an independent identically distributed
(i.i.d) assumption. Therefore, in the settings of federated
learning where data is non-i.i.d, most tolerance-based methods
do not perform well. The relaxation of data distribution
brings challenge to the tolerance-based methods. However, the
tolerance-based methods have the benefit of simplicity that
do not require additional training. Non-i.i.d tolerance-based
methods are challenging and interesting at the same time.
As shown in Table. I, we compare the performance of
different protection approaches for gradient-aggregation, and
analyze their computation complexities, under two settings,
i.e., the normal setting and the federated learning setting.
C. Protection over Decentralized Machine Learning
Recall that we have analyzed how a decentralized learning
system is more promising than the centralized in terms of
efficiency and reliability at large scale networks. However, the
decentralized byzantine-resilient aggregation and the parame-
ter protection for byzantine models have been ignore.
In a decentralized scheme, each node, including the ma-
licious one, has a great impact on the global aggregation.
As shown in Fig. 2, the existing protection methods are
not applicable to the decentralized settings because of the
following reasons.
• Attacks on partial aggregation are detrimental. Every
node aggregates a partial aggregation provided by another
node. For byzantine nodes, they have more attack patterns
undermining learning tasks, such as sending falsified
partial aggregation results or sending nothing to interrupt
the aggregation process. Thus, without a quorum of
validators in a multi-party network, partial aggregation
process cannot be trusted.
• Without a trusted third party, anomaly-detection would
be challenging. Credit scores of learning can be easily
falsified without proper validation mechanisms.
• Moreover, synchronization of model parameters could be
a problem. Every node needs to maintain a local training
model. Once contaminated by attackers, computing nodes
will have no actual contribution to the holistic learning
task.
In summary, blockchain as a decentralized SMR system, can
provide a quorums of validators and practical synchronization
mechanism to achieve byzantine-resiliency in decentralized
learning.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL - PIRATE: A MACHINE LEARNING
FRAMEWORK BASED ON SHARDING TECHNIQUE
A. Overview of PIRATE
Generally, we propose a framework of blockchain-based
protection framework for the distributed-machine learning that
is named PIRATE and managed in a decentralized manner. To
protect both the gradient aggregation and model parameters,
the proposed approach utilizes a sharding-based blockchain
protocol and gradient anomaly-detection [7]. Furthermore,
with anomaly detection, the malicious nodes who yield harm-
ful gradients can be replaced by eliminating their effort.
The proposed framework can be also applicable for feder-
ated learning under a decentralized configuration, where no a
centralized parameter server is required.
5TABLE I
GRADIENT PROTECTION METHODS
Method types The tolerance-based The detection-based The learning-based
Representative studies Krum [5] l-nearest Anomaly Detection [7] Learning to learn [13]gradients [11]
Resiliency under 30% attack High Medium Unknown High
Resiliency under 30% attack (FL) Low Unknown High Unknown
Resiliency under majority attack Low Medium Unknown High
Resiliency under majority attack (FL) Low Unknown High Unknown
Computation complexity O(n2) O(n) O(n) Model-related
Other functions except aggregation None Autoencoder training Aggregator training
Fig. 2. While adopting the Ring Allreduce1 mechanism, malicious attackers
can perform attacking from both inside and outside. 1 Attackers from the
outside can contaminate training models in target nodes. 2 The outside
attackers can also attack partial gradient-aggregation. 3 Byzantine computing
nodes can send harmful aggregations that damage the convergence of learning
tasks.
B. Permission/Access Control
In a distributed learning task with high availability, reli-
ability assessment is essential for all participants, especially
the mobile devices, which have volatile states. For instance,
devices could be busy running some CPU-consumed tasks
or simply charging in a sleeping mode. In the perspective
of network conditions, they can be well connected in a net
cafe or without signal at all while travelling through a tunnel.
Allowing devices that are in bad states to keep their learning
tasks would severely slow down the entire learning process.
Thus, the volatile states of devices demand real-time reliability
assessment to conduct permission control.
We propose a centralized solution for permission control.
Fig. 1 depicts the permission/access control of PIRATE. Sim-
ilar to federated learning, before actually contributing to the
global learning task, all nodes are assessed by a centralized
component based on their computation ability, network condi-
tion, join/leave prospect and historical credit scores. Nodes
once granted permission, can join a committee using the
Bounded Cuckoo rule [9].
During training, validated credit scores generated by com-
mittees are transmitted to the permission-control center. Nodes
with low accumulated credit scores would be evicted from the
system.
C. Sharding-based Blockchain Protection towards Decentral-
ized Distributed-Learning
We propose a sharding-based blockchain mechanism for
the protection of decentralized distributed-learning. Existing
byzantine-resilient aggregation solutions are not applicable un-
der the decentralized settings. Having considered the increased
freedom of byzantine nodes, our mechanism provides a con-
sensus protocol on model parameters and gradient aggregation.
Taking the advantages of 5G techniques, the sharding-based
protection can work efficiently.
We randomly split the computing nodes into multiple com-
mittees, in which partial aggregations are agreed among com-
mittee members. Since aggregations are no longer centralized,
the burden of aggregation workload is mitigated.
Let n denote the total number of computing nodes, c denote
the size of a committee, we assume that through permission
management, every nodes computation time for local gradients
is roughly the same. All nodes have mini-batches assigned
according to their computation resources. We then discuss the
key steps of the proposed framework.
Random committee-construction. All nodes would have
a random identity. According to the identities, committees
of size c are formed. Every committee member knows the
identity of all honest peers with high probability. After a
certain number of rounds of training, a portion of nodes
would be replaced by reliable nodes to prevent slowly-adaptive
adversary [14].
Intra-committee consensus. In the first round, every mem-
ber gossips its local gradient with the timestamp of the gossip-
ing among its committee. In every step, a leader would aggre-
gate two things: an agreed selection of c2/n gradients and the
neighbors aggregation from last step. Meanwhile, members
of the committee are required to validate the result. After
a global stabilization time (GST), an agreement is reached
by a partially synchronous consensus protocol Hotstuff [8] in
every committee. With a sufficient number of members having
agreed and partially signed (threshold signature) on the data,
the data is tamper-proof. Only the partial aggregation result is
to be transmitted to the neighbor committee.
Global consensus. Similar to the Ring Allreduce1 process,
committees communicate locally agreed data with their neigh-
bor committees. After 2(n/c − 1) steps, every node in the
system would finally have a globally agreed aggregation.
1https://github.com/baidu-research/baidu-allreduce
6Reconfiguration. After some iterations of training, some
malicious nodes in the committees are replaced. We use
Cuckoo Rule [9] against join/leave attack while maintaining a
same resiliency of 1/3 after reconfiguration.
D. Intra-Committee Consensus
As illustrated in figure 3, a learning task proceeds in
iterations, wherein each iterations consist of steps. In an
iteration, all nodes start by computing their local gradients and
ends by updating the model parameters as in all distributed
learning procedures. In each step, all nodes take part in a
consensus process to ensure that byzantine efforts are limited.
When a local gradient is computed, members take part in
repeated consensus steps. A consensus step (CS) includes:
• Component 1: local gradient selection,
• Component 2: neighbor committee aggregation,
• Component 3: aggregation result.
Fig. 3 depicts the intra-committee consensus process. We
define the process of finishing a partial aggregation a step,
the process of finishing a model update an iteration. We
utilize the three-phase chained Hotstuff consensus protocol [8],
wherein a consensus step require 4 phases of communication.
Each phase is driven by a leader issuing a block containing
verifiable quorum certificates. For component 1, committee
members can either collaboratively select c2/n local gradients,
or coordinate in a round robin manner to choose c2/n local
gradients. Having a neighbor committee aggregation and a set
of local gradients, both leaders and members can aggregate
them using the detection-based BFT aggregation [7]. A pre-
trained anomaly detection model would assign a weight to
each gradient according to the anomaly score. If the anomaly
score surpasses a threshold, zero weight would be assigned
accordingly, thereby filtering harmful gradients that hinders
convergence. Meanwhile, members are required to store his-
torical credit scores of each other until a new committee is
formed. Before the committee reconfiguration, credit scores
are transmitted to the permission control center.
For component 2, members wait for the leader of the
neighbor committee to broadcast the tamper-proof neighbor
aggregation from last step. Since component 2 is an agreed
aggregation result from the neighbors last step, it can be
easily verified. Finally for component 3, the incumbent leader
broadcast the partial aggregation and a hash index of training
parameters for members to verify and agree on. Having
sufficient quorum certificates, the leader would broadcast the
decided aggregation in the committee and in the neighbor
committee. If the leader chooses to withhold the result from
the neighbor committee, the neighbor committee can ask a
random committee member for the result.
As shown in Fig. 3, in order to reach a consensus decision
(CS4), three phases of validation are required. This means that
only 1/4 of blocks are generating aggregations. To address
this issue, we can pipeline consensus steps as encapsulated
commands to achieve a better performance. As Fig. 3 shows,
utilizing the frequent view-change of Hotstuff, each leader
would be responsible for driving four consensus steps in
different phases, with each phase validating an aggregation
proposal. In an ideal scenario where no byzantine leader
is elected, every block generates an agreed aggregation in
average. Members are required to store four sets of gradients
for validation, with each set composed of its own local
gradient, corresponding aggregation of neighbor committee
and an aggregation proposal from incumbent leader. Since
PIRATE does not rely on rollback to recover from misdirection
of the byzantine leadership, computing nodes are free from the
storage burden of the entire history of all gradients.
V. CASE STUDY
A. Implementation and Methods
We implement a prototype of PIRATE with python 3.7
for performance evaluation. On one machine, we run 50 to
100 instances each to simulate a single committee. Assuming
after permission control, devices spend a same amount of time
for computing gradients. We simulate this process by having
instances wait for a same amount of time to generate an equal-
sized chunk of data (28MB). Then, instances transmit chunks
of data to simulate a decentralized SGD process. The machine
is a mini PC (model serial number: NUC8i5BEK), with a
quad-core i5-8259U processor (up to 3.80 GHz). To simulate
the network condition of 5G, we assume every message has
a 10ms latency. And the uplink bandwidth is uniformly-
distributed ranging from 80Mbps to 240Mbps, while the
downlink bandwidth is set to 1Gbps for each node.
In order to minimize the communication overhead of gradi-
ent broadcast, we fix the ratio between n/c2 to 4/1, to ensure
exactly one local gradient and neighbors gradient is aggregated
in each consensus step.
B. Performance Evaluation
We compare our prototype with another blockchain-based
SGD framework LearningChain without the presence of ma-
licious node. We first compare the gradient storage overhead
of the two frameworks. We then compare the iteration time
measured by the time used to broadcast a block that contains
the necessary information for nodes to progress in D-SGD.
As Fig. 4 shows, gradient storage overhead for PIRATE
nodes are constant as iteration progresses, while Learn-
ingChains storage has a linear growth. In each iteration,
PIRATE stores only the leaders gradient, the neighbor com-
mittees gradient and the local gradient itself has computed.
In LearningChain, nodes are required to store the history
of all leader-announced gradients, and the local gradients
broadcasted by all nodes.
Fig. 4 shows that PIRATE outperforms LearningChain on
iteration time, i.e., the time used for each node to get a model
update. The major cost in each iteration is the broadcast of gra-
dients. Broadcasting to a larger number of nodes significantly
increase the cost. PIRATE shows a superior performance in
terms of iteration time for each committee. This is because
nodes are required to broadcast to only c members, meanwhile,
consensus decisions are reached in a parallel manner.
7Fig. 3. We define the process of finishing a partial aggregation a step, the process of finishing a model update an iteration. A consensus step (CS) has 4
phases, each driven by leader. The protocol can be pipelined for performance enhancement, ideally executing 1 aggregation each block in average.
Fig. 4. The left-top figure: Gradient Storage of PIRATE vs. iteration with
single gradient size of 28MB. The right-top figure: Gradient Storage of
LearningChain vs. iteration with the single-gradient size of 28MB. The
Bottom figure: Iteration time of PIRATE and LearningChain vs. number of
nodes with the single-gradient sizes of 28MB and 10MB.
VI. OPEN ISSUES
The open issues are envisioned as follows.
• Decentralized Permission Control. Other than
join/leave Sybil attacks, candidates having inferior
computation ability, bad historical credit scores and
unstable network conditions can undermine the efficiency
of distributed learning. Without a centralized permission
control, reliability assessment is challenging, especially
for realtime states. However, for a decentralized system,
latency induced by communication and verification
inevitably affects timeliness. We can utilize an anchor
chain to manage non-realtime states of devices to achieve
further decentralization. The anchor chain is maintained
by all candidates. Permissions to join shard chains, (i.e.
learning committees) are jointly managed by the anchor
Chain and a real-time assessment component.
• Protection Against Model Poisoning Attack. For fed-
erated learning, model-poisoning attack is a challenging
issue in terms of safety. The attack can be successful
even for a highly constrained byzantine node [15]. By
exploiting the non-i.i.d property of data shards, byzantine
attackers can send poisoned local updates that do not hurt
convergence. Such harmful local updates can still affect
the global model that triggers misclassifying. The attack
method is also “sneaky” enough to bypass accuracy check
by a central server. In a decentralized environment, where
nodes are less constrained in terms of communicating,
computing and validating, model poisoning attack can be
even more threatening.
• Incentive Mechanism. In a decentralized setting, each
node shares greater responsibility than the nodes in a
centralized setting. This is because they are constantly
required to conduct actions, like validations and broad-
casting, which seem non-rewarding through the perspec-
tive of an individual. Since PIRATE is built based on a
blockchain system, incentive mechanisms of participating
can be naturally guaranteed.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To guarantee the high availability of distributed learning in
5G era, a distributed-learning framework with high efficiency,
decentralization and byzantine-resiliency is in urgent need.
To fill this gap, we propose PIRATE, a byzantine-resilient
D-SGD framework under the decentralized settings. Utilizing
a sharding-based blockchain protocol, model parameters and
gradient aggregations can be well protected. We then evaluate
the feasibility of the PIRATE in a scenario where the large
scale participants are with large-sized local models. Simulation
results show that the proposed PIRATE is more efficient
than an existing LearningChain solution in terms of both
communication time and storage complexity.
We will further analyze the robustness and resiliency of
PIRATE by conducting extensive experiments. Currently, we
are developing a byzantine-resilient aggregation algorithm
dedicated for PIRATE, by considering the efficiency of com-
putation and communication.
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